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We investigated the effect of changes in CEO position on subsequent firm performance by studying 91 CEO turnovers in Indonesia. Our results show that firm performance decreases during the
turnover year. Moreover, the incoming CEO does not increase firm performance in subsequent years.
Indeed, there is evidence that firm performance decreases after such turnovers. We ultimately conclude that CEO turnovers in Indonesia do not have a positive effect on firm performance. Going
further, we divided CEO turnovers into routine and non-routine turnovers on the basis of the turnover
process. Both routine and non-routine CEO turnovers show similar results with all samples, in which
the incoming CEO in a routine or non-routine turnover does not have a positive effect upon firm performance. Further evidence suggests that the incoming CEO tends to upsize firm assets rather than
downsize them.
Keywords: CEO Turnover; Firm Performance; Routine Turnover; Non-routine Turnover; Upsizing
JEL classification: M51; J63; G30

Introduction
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is a person
who holds the highest executive position in a
firm. The CEO plays a central role in formulating and implementing a firm’s mission and vision, developing firm strategy to achieve shortterm and long-term objectives, allocating firm
resources and investment decisions (Canals,
2010). Therefore, the CEO has significant influence on firm strategies (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011) and policies; financial, operating, and investment decisions; (Bertrand &
Schoar, 2003; DeJong & Ling, 2013), accounting choices (DeJong & Ling, 2013); and ultimately firm performance (Mackey, 2008). The
CEO is expected to deliver good performance.
If a CEO fails to deliver good performance, the

board may implement a disciplinary measure.
Several previous studies show that the probability of CEO turnover is negatively correlated
with firm performance in the US (Chakraborty
& Sheikh, 2008; Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino,
2004; Wang, Davidson III, & Wang, 2010).
In emerging markets, some studies have also
found a negative relationship between firm performance and the probability of a CEO turnover (for example, Fan, Lau, & Young, 2007;
and Kato & Long, 2006a and 2006b for China;
and Hou & Chuang, 2008 in Taiwan). CEOs
face higher probability of being sacked when
they cannot deliver good performance. The replacement of a CEO is an important event for
a firm. Investors expect that incoming CEO
would improve the firm’s performance (Denis
& Denis, 1995; Huson et al., 2004). Denis and
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Denis (1995) investigated the impact of new
CEOs upon firm performance in the US. They
showed that subsequent firm performance improved after the change, or in other words the
replacement of the CEO has a positive effect
on firm performance. Furthermore, they found
that new CEOs tend to downsize firm assets and
employee numbers. However, existing studies
on CEO turnover and firm performance have
mostly been conducted in developed countries.
The difference in institutional settings may lead
to the contention that empirical results from
developed countries cannot be generalized to
developing countries. Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011) suggested that studies should be
carried out in various countries to understand
the disparity in local contexts.
This present paper re-examines the impact of
CEO turnover on firm performance in Indonesia under the influence of its distinct characteristics. First, Indonesia makes use of the two-tier
board system. Second, equity ownership structures are mostly concentrated in family hands.
Each company has two boards: the board of
directors and the board of commissioners. The
Board of directors (BOD) is responsible for the
(executive) management of the firm, while the
board of commissioners (BOC)1 performs the
monitoring function and provides advice to the
BOD. The CEO in Indonesia is the coordinator
of the board of directors. The members of the
BOD are not allowed to hold any position in the
BOC, which means that the BOC must be independent from the BOD. This reduces the opportunity for a conflict of interest so that the BOC
can perform its duties properly in enhancing the
company’s performance. If a CEO fails to show
adequate performance, the BOC can suspend
him/her and ask for him/her to be replaced the
general meeting of shareholders.
Few studies have been done in the Indonesian context, such as Lindrianasari and Hartono
(2011), and Setiawan, Phua, and Chee (2013).
Lindrianasari and Hartono (2010) found a negative relationship between firm performance
and the probability of CEO turnover. It could

be concluded that Indonesian CEOs who do
not perform well have a higher probability of
dismissal. This result indicates that BOCs are
properly carrying out their task in disciplining
CEOs with poor performance. Setiawan et al.
(2013) investigated how Indonesian investors
react to the announcements of CEO turnover.
They show that investors perceive CEO turnover as good news and react positively. However, these studies did not analyze the effect of the
incoming CEO on firm performance.
Going deeper, we also consider the distinction between routine and non-routine turnovers.
Arguably, incoming CEOs from non-routine
turnovers are under greater pressure to deliver
good performance for having replaced a poorlyperforming CEO. Kang and Shivdasani (1995)
found that non-routine turnovers in Japan increase firm performance while routine turnovers do not. Denis and Denis (1995) revealed
that both the turnover processes increase firm
performance. On the other hand, Dahya, Lonie,
and Power (1998) did not find any significant
effect from routine turnover upon firm performance. Therefore, it is important to investigate
how the turnover process affects subsequent
firm performance.

Literature Review
The CEO is an important figure in a firm.
Mackey (2008) found that CEOs have significant effect on firm performance. The CEO is
expected to improve the firm’s performance.
CEOs work under a reward and punishment
system where high-performing CEOs earn bonuses while poorly-performing CEOs are disciplined by shareholders through the boards.
Therefore, CEOs have an incentive to achieve
higher performance.
A CEO with a poor performance must face
a discipline mechanism, and in the worst case
he/she can be sacked from his/her position.
This means that CEOs with poor performance
have a higher probability of dismissal. Most
empirical evidence confirms the negative re-

The BOC is made up of shareholders’ representatives tasked with monitoring the BOD’s performance. It includes both
independent and non-independent members. The independent commissioners are expected to represent the interests of
minority shareholders (i.e. the public).

1

2
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v9i1.6300

2

Setiawan et al.: CEO Turnover and Firm Performance In Indonesia
D. Setiawan, L. K. Phua, H. K. Chee, and I.Trinugroho / Indonesian Capital Market Review 9 (2017) 1-10

lationship between performance and the probability of CEO turnover (for example, Huson
et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2010). Wang et al.
(2010) studied 670 CEO turnovers in 19992005 in the US to investigate the relationship
between poor performance and the probability
of forced CEO turnovers. They found a negative relationship between firm performance
and probability of forced CEO turnover. This
result is in line with Huson, et al. (2004), who
found that firm performance tends to be lower
before CEO turnovers. Weisbach (1988) also
found an inverse relationship between prior
performance and probability of CEO turnover.
Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2003) revealed that
the board of directors employ market-based
and accounting-based information to evaluate
CEO performance. Poor performance, whether
market-based or accounting-based, increase the
probability of CEO turnover.
Lausten (2002) investigated the relationship
between firm performance and CEO turnover in
Denmark by studying 243 firms and 77 turnovers over the 1992-1995 period. This study
found that firm performance is negatively associated with the probability of CEO turnover.
This result is in line with Neumann and Voetmann (2005) who found and inverse relationship between firm performance and probability
of CEO turnover. Pope and Florou (2008) investigated the link between firm performance
and CEO turnover in the 300 largest UK firms
from 1990 – 1998. They showed that a CEO
faces a higher probability of being fired if his/
her performance is poor. This result is consistent with Conyon and Florou (2002) who found
that CEOs are highly likely to be dismissed if
they performs poorly.
Defond and Hung (2004) undertook a multicountry study that showed a negative relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. However, they only found this negative
relationship in countries with strong corporate
governance practices, and not in countries with
poor corporate governance. This result shows
that CEOs in countries with poor corporate governance can entrench themselves in their positions. Gibson (2003) showed that CEOs with
poor performance in nine emerging markets

have a high probability of being fired, which
means that CEOs also faces high probability
of turnover for bad performance in emergingmarket firms.
In recent years many papers have discussed
the relationship between firm turnovers and
CEO turnovers in China such as Chi and Wang
(2009), Fan et al. (2007), Firth, Fung and Rui
(2006), Kato and Long (2006a, 2006b), and Pi
and Lowe (2011). Although China has different
governance characteristics from western countries, most previous studies confirm the negative relationship between firm performance and
CEO turnovers (e.g. Fan et al., 2007; Firth et
al., 2006; Pi & Lowe, 2011), except Chi and
Wang (2009) who did not find any significant
effect from firm performance upon top executive turnovers. These results show that CEOs in
China faces higher probability of dismissal if
firm performance is poor. A negative relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover is also found in Indonesia (Lindrianasari &
Hartono, 2011; Martani & Tarigan, 2009). Lindrianasari and Hartono (2011) found that poor
performance increases the probability of CEO
turnover. Martani and Tarigan (2009), using
state-owned enterprises (SOE) as their sample,
also documented that poor performance increases the probability of forced director turnover.
It has been explained above that incoming CEOs are expected to improve their firms’
performance. Denis and Denis (1995) found
evidence that incoming CEOs have a positive
impact on firms. There is a significant improvement in firm operating income after the change
of CEO. This results is confirmed by Kato and
Long (2006a), who found that CEO turnover
in China have a positive effect on firm performance. The incoming CEOs are often able to
improve their firms’ performance. Salomo and
Leker (2000) found that CEO turnovers in Germany have a positive effect upon firm performance in the subsequent year. This evidences
shows that CEO turnovers have a positive effect upon firm performance. However, Lindrianasari and Hartono (2011) found that CEO
turnovers in Indonesia do not have any effect
upon firm performance. There is no difference
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in ROAs before and after the CEO turnover.
Previous studies show that CEO turnover improves firm performance (Denis & Denis, 1995;
Kato & Long, 2006a; Salomo & Leker, 2000),
except Lindrianasari and Hartono (2011). Thus,
we would expect CEO turnovers in Indonesia to
improve firm performance.
H1: Firm performance is improved after CEO
turnover event.
We also investigate the effect of whether the
turnover is routine or non-routine upon firm
performance. Denis and Denis (1995) found
that both kinds of turnovers resulted in an improvement of firm performance. On the other
hand, Lindrianasari and Hartono (2011) did not
find any significant effect from either routine or
non-routine turnovers upon firm performance.
Salomo and Leker (2000) found that involuntary turnovers have a positive effect on firm
performance. CEOs with poor performance
have a higher probability of being fired, so incoming CEOs in non-routine turnovers face
greater pressure to achieve higher performance.
H2: Firm performance is improved after routine/non-routine CEO turnover event.
Weisbach (1995) argues that one of the reasons investors pay attention to CEO succession
is because it signals a change in future corporate decisions. When incoming CEOs attempt
to increase their firms’ efficiency and effectiveness through restructuring, they may take radical action to reduce the number of employees
and total assets. Incoming CEOs try to reduce
employee numbers if employee costs are high
enough to compromise their firms’ competitiveness in the market. Christoph Mueller was hired
as CEO in Malaysia Airlines (MAS) on May 1,
2015 when MAS was struggling for survival
due to its poor financial condition and the unprecedented tragedy of losing two aircraft in the
same year. Christoph Mueller dismissed 30%
of MAS employees, restructured the firm’s assets, and made other strategic decisions to improve the firm’s performance. As a result, MAS
turned to profitability in early 2017. This is a
good signal for MAS. This case shows that incoming CEOs can conduct firm restructuring to
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improve firm value. Chiu et al. (2016) provided
evidence that incoming CEOs tend to engage in
corporate divestiture. Incoming CEOs from inside the firm focus on higher scale of divestiture
while incoming CEOs from the outside focus
on higher scope of divestiture. Therefore, it is
important to investigate how incoming CEOs
manage the number of employees and total assets.
Weisbach (1995) found that incoming CEOs
tend to review their predecessors’ investment
decisions. Incoming CEOs prefer to sell unprofitable investments to increase firm value, thus
restructuring their firms after their appointment
as the new leader. Denis and Denis (1995) provide evidence that incoming CEOs engage in
downsizing of the firm. The incoming CEOs reduce the number of employees, total assets, and
capital expenditure. This downsizing decision is
expected to improve efficiency and effectively
enhance firm performance. On the other hand,
Huson et al. (2004) showed that company assets
tend to grow three years after CEO turnovers
compared to one year before CEO turnovers
and that firms spend more on capital expenditure. This result contradicts Denis and Denis
(1995) and Weisbach (1995). By studying Indonesian firms, Lindrianasari and Hartono (2011)
found that total assets after CEO turnover are
marginally greater than before CEO turnover. It
means that incoming CEOs in Indonesia tend to
upsize total assets rather than downsizing them.
Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998) revealed different behaviors between incoming CEOs from
routine and non-routine turnovers. They found
that incoming CEOs in routine turnovers tend
to increase their firms’ assets while new CEOs
in non-routine turnovers reduce firm assets. On
the other hand, Denis and Denis (1995) provided evidence that incoming CEOs from both
routine and non-routine turnovers downsize
firms, while Huson et al. (2004) showed that
new CEOs from both routine and non-routine
turnovers spend more on capital expenditures
and increase total assets. Since previous studies
have produced inconclusive results about the
effect of CEO turnovers upon total assets, we
propose a non-directional hypothesis.
H3: Total assets after CEO turnover are differ-
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
t-2
t-1
t
t+1
t+2

ROA
2.023
0.446
-2.819
-0.517
-1.517

ALL
ROE
TA
1.723 3089436
-2.444 4231452
-14.951 4577310
-4.322 4752153
-3.024 5116304

EMPL
5834790
5061410
5336690
4380270
4573150

ROA
2.926
2.664
0.791
-0.652
-1.839

ROUTINE
ROE
TA
2.104 1700824
2.025 1902686
-8.642 2062054
-0.706 2450046
-11.442 2833831

EMPL
4331128
3864553
3897957
3882702
3955106

ROA
1.105
-1.29
-4.076
-1.084
-0.758

NON-ROUTINE
ROE
TA
1.317 4573366
-7.217 6718997
-21.691 7264060
-8.185 7211321
5.969 7554400

EMPL
7446091
6339864
6873523
4911773
5233341

Note: All = all CEO turnover, Routine = routine CEO turnover, Non-routine = non-routine CEO turnover
N all sample = 91, N routine turnover = 47, N non-routine turnover = 44 			
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TA = total assets, Empl = number of employees

ent from total assets before CEO turnover.
H4: The number of employees after CEO turnover is different from the number of employees before CEO turnover.

Research Methods
Our sample consists of CEO turnovers in
all Indonesian publicly traded firms over the
1994 – 2002 period. This study follows Denis
and Denis (1995) and Kato and Long (2006a,
2006b) who used all publicly listed firms in the
US and China respectively in their studies. They
investigated the effect of CEO turnover on firm
performance. As explained above, Indonesia
has a two-tier board system: Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners. The CEO is
equivalent to the chairman of the Board of Directors. In Indonesia, the CEO is also commonly known as the Direktur Utama (Dirut) or the
Presiden Direktur (Presdir). We identify CEO
turnovers by comparing the names of CEOs
in two consecutive years according to the Indonesian Capital market Directory (ICMD). A
CEO turnover is deemed to have taken place if
the names are different. We also distinguish between routine and non-routine CEO turnovers
by browsing relevant articles or news items
in the authoritative Indonesian newspapers:
Kompas and Neraca. When we cannot find any
relevant news about CEO turnover, we follow
the work of Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1996)
where a turnover is deemed routine if the departing CEO still holds a position in the BOD.
Since Indonesia has a two-tier board system,
we also consider the turnover routine if the departing CEO still holds a position in the BOC.
Otherwise, we define the CEO turnover event

as non-routine.
Our analysis covers a five-year period
around the turnover event (t-2 to t+2), t being
the turnover year. Since publicly traded firms
in Indonesia end their financial year on 31 December and they must publicize turnover events
within 3 months of that date, we decided that
30 March is the cut-off point for determining
t. The T-test is employed to test the hypotheses. If firms experience more than one turnover
event in the 5-year period, the study will use
the most recent one. This study compares firm
performance before and after CEO turnovers.
To measure firm performance, we use the accounting performance measures of Return on
Assets and Return on Equity (Chen, Cheng,
& Dai, 2013; Kato & Long, 2006a, 2006b). In
addition, we use total assets and total number
of employees to investigate the effect of CEO
turnover on firm restructuring (Denis & Denis,
1995).

Results and Discussions
Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 91 CEO turnovers
in Indonesian publicly traded firms during the
1994 – 2002 period. In terms of the turnover
process, there are 47 routine CEO turnovers and
44 non-routine CEO turnovers. Table 1 presents
the descriptive statistics of variables.
As shown in Table 1, ROA before turnover
year tends to be positive on average. However,
it tends to turn negative in the turnover year.
This shows that firm performance decreases
during the turnover year. Two years following
the turnover, the ROA usually improves even
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Table 2. CEO Turnover and Firm Performance
t-2,t
t-2,t+1
t-2,t+2
t-1,t
t-1,t+1
t-1,t+2
t,t+1
t,t+2

ALL

ROA
R

-2.494
[0.013]**
-2.27
[0.023]**
-2.257
[0.024]**
-1.945
[0.052]*
-0.781
[0.435]
-1.168
[0.243]
-0.103
[0.918]
-0.21
[0.834]

-1.923
[0.054]*
-1.81
[0.070]*
-2.097
[0.036]**
-1.788
[0.074]*
-1.317
[0.188]
-1.921
[0.055]*
-1.026
[0.305]
-1.058
[0.290]

NR

ALL

ROE
R

-1.681
-2.923
-1.503
[0.093]* [0.003]*** [0.133]
-1.377
-1.261
-0.923
[0.168]
[0.207]
[0.356]
-1.027
-0.805
-0.931
[0.304]
[0.421]
[0.352]
-0.916
-2.151
-1.584
[0.366]
[0.031]** [0.113]
-0.223
-0.006
-0.667
[0.823]
[0.955]
[0.505]
-0.315
-0.039
-1.016
[0.753]
[0.969]
[0.310]
-0.957
-0.723
-0.711
[0.339]
[0.469]
[0.477]
-0.852
-0.819
-1.302
[0.394]
[0.413]
[0.193]

NR

ALL

-2.657
[0.008]***
-0.957
[0.339]
-0.239
[0.811]
-1.488
[0.137]
-0.761
[0.447]
-1.269
[0.204]
-1.872
[0.061]*
-2.474
[0.013]**

-3.945
[0.000]***
-4.069
[0.000]***
-5.49
[0.000]***
-1.663
[0.096]*
-2.266
[0.023]**
-3.092
[0.002]***
-2.593
[0.10]***
-3.867
[0.000]***

ASSETS
R

NR

-2.431
-3.104
[0.015]** [0.002]***
-2.851
-2.941
[0.004]*** [0.003]***
-2.944
-4.796
[0.003]*** [0.000]***
-1.569
-0.805
[0.117]
[0.421]
-2.041
-1.214
[0.041]** [0.225]
-2.41
-1.902
[0.016}** [0.057]*
-2.862
-0.782
[0.004]*** [0.434]
-3.005
-2.474
[0.003]*** [0.013]**

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
ALL
R
NR
-1.178
[0.239]
-0.861
[0.389]
-0.416
[0.677]
-1.542
[0.123]
-0.701
[0.483]
-0.436
[0.668]
-0.722
[0.470]
-0.518
[0.604]

-1.524
[0.127]
-0.381
[0.435]
-0.841
[0.400]
-1.443
[0.149]
-0.988
[0.323]
-1.365
[0.172]
-0.412
[0.681]
-1.044
[0.296]

-0.235
[0.814]
-0.377
[0.706]
-0.497
[0.619]
-0.769
[0.442]
-0.016
[0.987]
0.963
[0.336]
-1.48
[0.139]
-1.999
[0.046]**

Note: All = all CEO turnover, R = routine CEO turnover, NR = non-routine CEO turnover
All CEO Turnover = 91 events, routine turnover = 47 events, non-routine CEO turnover = 44 events, during the 1994 – 2002 period
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%
ROA = Return on Assets, ROE = Return on Equity
Numbers without parentheses are t-values, while number in parentheses are p-values

though it remains negative. This pattern holds
for both routine and non-routine CEO turnovers. In the table of descriptive statistics, it is
shown that firms with CEO turnover have positive ROE in t-2. However, it decreases in t-1
and t. ROEt-1 and ROEt are negative. Further,
ROE increases in the year after the turnover
but remains negative. This result is similar to
the ROA trend. Firms that experience routine
turnover have lower ROEs in the post-turnover
years. However, firms with non-routine CEO
turnover show a different pattern. There is positive ROE in the two years following turnover.
This pattern shows that there is an improvement
in firm performance after non-routine CEO
turnovers. A detailed discussion on firm performance is provided in the next section.
Empirical Results
The results of hypothesis testing are presented in Table 2. Table 2 shows that the ROA
in the turnover year is less than the ROA before the CEO turnover, which means that firm
performance decreases in the turnover year.
However, comparison between ROAs before
the CEO turnover and after the CEO turnover
shows that there is no significant difference between ROAs before and after the CEO turno6
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ver. The incoming CEOs do not have a positive
effect on firm performance. Furthermore, the
comparison between ROAt+1, ROAt+2 and ROAt
also produce no significant results. As shown
in Table 2, there are significant differences between ROAt-2 and ROAt+1, and between ROAt-2
and ROAt+2. However, firm performance after
the CEO turnover is lower than before the CEO
turnover. This result shows that the incoming
CEOs do not improve their firms’ performance;
the performance of incoming CEOs is worse
compared to the departing CEOs.
We can see in Table 2 that the
comparison between ROEs before and after
the CEO turno-ver shows similar trends with
the ROA. ROEt-2 and ROEt-1 are higher than
ROEt. It can be seen that firm performance
decreases in the turnover year. Further, the
comparison between ROEs before after the
CEO turnover does not produce any significant
results. These results show that incoming
CEOs do not have a positive effect on firm
performance. The comparisons between ROEt
and ROEt+1 and between ROEt and ROEt+2 do
not exhibit any significant results either.
Firm performance after CEO turnover does not
differ from the turnover year and before
CEO turnover. According to the statistical
test as shown in Table 1, firm performance
(in terms of ROA and ROE) does not improve
after CEO
6
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turnover. We therefore reject H1.
Going deeper by distinguishing routine from
non-routine CEO turnovers produces similar results. In firms that experienced routine turnover,
their ROAt+1 and ROAt+2 are lower than ROAt-2,
ROAt-1, and ROAt. These results show that incoming CEOs in routine turnovers do not have
a positive effect on firm performance. Indeed,
incoming CEOs from routine turnovers tend to
have lower performance than departing CEOs.
Table 1 shows that firms with routine turnovers
do not have higher ROEs. The comparison between performance before turnovers (ROEt-2,
ROEt-1) and after turnovers (ROEt+2, ROEt+1)
exhibits that CEO turnovers do not produce any
significant results. There is no improvement on
firm performance after routine turnover. Therefore, H2 is rejected.
As seen in Table 2, total assets increased
during the 5 years under observation. There
is a significant increase in total assets in the
turnover year compared to before the turnover.
Further analysis shows that firms experiencing
CEO turnover have more assets after the turnover year. This result shows that incoming CEOs
upsize firm assets. A scrutiny of the effects of
routine and non-routine CEO turnovers upon
total assets also shows consistent findings. Both
routine and non-routine CEOs turnovers lead
to an increase in assets following the turnover.
Thus, we conclude that H3 is supported.
As can be seen in Table 2, the number of
employees after CEO turnovers does not differ from the number of employees before CEO
turnovers. These results provide evidence that
incoming CEOs seldom make any significant decision about the number of employees,
whether laying off employees to reduce expenses or aggressively hiring more employees. Routine and non-routine CEOs turnovers exhibit
similar trends in this regard; there is no significant difference in the number of employees
before and after CEO turnovers in either case.
However, non-routine CEO turnovers lead to
reduced number of employees in the two years
following the turnover. Thus, non-routine CEO
turnovers tend to lead to significant decisions to
reduce the number of employees.

Discussions
Our empirical results reveal that CEO turnovers do not have any positive impacts upon
firm performance. Indeed, CEO turnovers
tend to lead to a decrease in firm performance.
This differs from the findings of Denis and
Denis (1995), Huson, et al. (2004), and Kato
and Long (2006a), who found that firm performance increases after turnover events. Our
findings, however, are somewhat in line with
Lindrianasari and Hartono (2011) who found
that CEO turnovers do not have a positive
outcome on post-turnover accounting performance. Likewise, Ahn, Bhattacharya, Jung, and
Nam (2009) documented that firm performance
in Japan is more likely to decline after turnover
events. Our findings are also in line with Garcia, Gonzalez, and Ortega (2006) who found a
negative impact from CEO turnover upon Venezuelan firms.
Going deeper, we found that CEO turnovers
have a positive effect on firm assets. There is
a significant increase in firm assets after CEO
turnovers, which means that incoming CEOs
tend to upsize firm assets. This is consistent
with Huson et al. (2004) who found that incoming CEOs make significant decision in increasing firm assets.
Nevertheless, we have not confirmed that incoming CEOs make significant decisions to lay
off or hire employees. There is no significant
difference in the number of employees before
and after CEO turnovers. This is not consistent
with Denis and Denis (1995) who found that incoming CEOs reduce the number of employees
to reduce firm expenses. This result may be due
to the relatively strict employment regulations
in Indonesia, which hinder incoming CEOs
from aggressively upsizing or downsizing the
number of employees.
The results of this study provide interesting
results in the context of how incoming CEOs
engage in firm restructuring. Instead of engaging in downsizing total assets, the incoming
CEOs upsize firm assets. In other words, incoming CEOs prefer to make the firm larger.
This result does not support previous research
findings, such as Denis and Denis (1995) and

7
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2017

7

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [2017], Art. 1
D. Setiawan, L. K. Phua, H. K. Chee, and I.Trinugroho / Indonesian Capital Market Review 9 (2017) 1-10

Weisbach (1995), who find that incoming CEOs
prefer to downsize firs. However, the result of
this study is in line with Huson et al. (2004)
who found that incoming CEOs use their discretion to increase firm performance.
Robustness Checks
We perform robustness checks to ensure that
our findings are consistent. Instead of unadjusted ROA, ROE, total assets and total employee numbers, we use industry-adjusted ROA,
ROE, total assets and total employees. We use
industry-adjusted data to control the effect of
industry trends on changes to firm profitability
and firm assets. The results are consistent with
regards to our main variables.

Conclusions
We have shown that CEO turnovers in Indonesia do not have any positive effects upon
firm performance and some firms that experience CEO turnovers have lower performance
than before the turnovers. These firms’ performance declined after the turnover. This result
is consistent for both routine and non-routine
turnovers. Moreover, we found that incoming
CEOs tend to upsize firm assets, given that our
empirical results display a significant increase
in total assets. However, no significant effect is
found on the link between CEO turnovers and
employee numbers.

The implications of this study are: first, investors need to give more attention on the succession events. CEO succession is an important
event in any company since it will have significant effects upon the firm’s future condition.
This study shows that firm performance decreases after CEO turnover events. The incoming CEO does not have any positive impact on
firm performance. However, as stated by Hillier
and McColgan (2009), there is a difference in
behavior between family CEOs and non-family
CEOs. This study has not analyzed the effect of
family ownership on the CEO turnover event.
Previous studies show the importance of family
ownership in Indonesia on company decisions
such as dividend payment (Setiawan et al.,
2016). This is a suggested area of research for
future studies. Second, the results of this study
show that incoming CEOs tend to increase the
firms’ assets. Incoming CEOs prefer to use firm
resources to increase firm assets rather than reducing them.
This paper uses the T-test to analyze differences in firm performance between the pre- and
post-CEO turnover periods. This technique
may fail to capture the possible endogeneity
between turnover and performance limitation.
However, we could not tackle this issue with
a different technique due to limited availability
of data and difficulties in defining the control
group. Therefore, it would be appropriate for
future studies to consider the endogeneity between firm performance and turnover.
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